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A VIABLE SUBSTITUTE FOR THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE: A CIVIL RIGHTS APPEALS BOARD
JOHN L. ROCHE*
Is the Supreme Court's judicially-created exclusionary rule to be a
permanent part of our national jurisprudence? Or is there an alternative
which may reasonably provide a substitute remedy, which is at the same
time both more effective and more positive? That there is such an alterna-
tive is the affirmative thesis of this paper.
I
It is no longer news that the judicial activism of the Supreme Court
in formulating a federal exclusionary rule,' and then extending its applica-
tion to the states,2 came about because of legislative inaction. The expres-
sions of the majority of the Court implied that the Congress and the
various state legislatures had failed in their duty to find a way adequately
to control police invasions of the civil rights of the citizens, 3 thereby
*Associate Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. J.D., 1965, University
of San Diego; member of the California bar.
'Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Weeks, the federal government
sought to adduce evidence consisting of letters and correspondence of the defendant, seized
in his house in his absence and without his authority. The United States Marshal who
effected the seizures held no warrant for the arrest of the accused and none for the search
of his premises. The Court held that in a federal prosecution the fourth amendment barred
the use of evidence secured through an illegal search and seizure.
[I]f letters and private documents can be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches
and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the constitution.
282 U.S. at 393. Thus the Weeks Court indulged in two assumptions: (1) that exclusion of
evidence would discourage illegal behavior, and (2) that there was no feasible alternative
for controlling such behavior.
2Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3In extending the exclusionary rule to the states, the Court in Mapp v. Ohio focused
on the lack of viable alternative measures to enforce the fourth amendment.
The experience of California that such other remedies have been worthless
and futile is buttressed by the experience of other States. The obvious
futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment to the protection of other
remedies has, moreover, been recognized by this court since Wolf [v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)].
367 U.S. at 652-53. In another decision extending the exclusionary rule, the Court quoted
with approval from People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955):
We have been compelled to reach that conclusion (to adopt the exclusion-
ary rule) because other remedies have completely failed to secure compli-
ance with the constitutional provisions on the part of the police officers
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leaving a void which must necessarily be judicially filled.'
Because of this legislative vacuum there was created, and then later
extended, the judicial concept that evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional rights of the citizens was not to be admitted in the courts
of the land: the exclusionary rule. What is unfortunate for our national
judicial system, and deserves our attention, is that after nearly sixty years
of negative experiences and loud public and news media complaint, the
same legislative vacuum still exists,' albeit slightly modified. The progres-
sion in the search by the Supreme Court for an effective remedy still goes
on, perhaps even at an accelerated pace. For example, dissatisfied with
the exclusionary rule alone, the Court has now proceeded to invent a
common law civil remedy affecting federal officers7 and supplementing
the limited rights available as to state officers in the Civil Rights Act of
1871.8
What occurs next in this progression is unknown, of course, but
whether one speaks of the Warren Court, the Nixon Court or any other,
with the attendant result that the courts under the old rule have been
constantly required to participate in, and in effect condone, the lawless
activities of law enforcement officers. . . . Experience has demonstrated,
however, that neither administrative, criminal, nor civil remedies are
effective in suppressing lawless searches and seizures. The innocent suffer
with the guilty, and we cannot close our eyes to the effect the rule we adopt
will have on the rights of those not before the court. 44 Cal. 2d at 445,
447, 282 P.2d at 911-12, 913.
Eliins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 220 (1960).
'See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652-53 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 392-94 (1914).
'If the purpose of the exclusionary rule be regarded as deterrence, recent analysis casts
considerable doubt upon the efficacy of the rule. See footnotes 9-14 and accompanying text
infra. Moreoever, as Wigmore noted, the exclusionary rules "serve neither to protect the
victim nor to punish the offender but rather to compensate the guilty victim by acquittal
and to punish the public by unloosing the criminal in their midst. 8 WIGIORE ON
EVIDENCE § 2184, at 51-52 (McNaughton ed. 1961).
'See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 412 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
'In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme
Court held that a cause of action for damages against federal law enforcement officers who
violate the fourth amendment could be inferred directly from constitutional provisions. 403
U.S. at 397.
'Civil Rights Act of 1871 § I, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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it appears clear that our national trend is toward forcing a legislative-
judicial confrontation which will require action by the former and which
must be more than a palliative. To date, with public dissatisfaction fo-
cused on the actions of the Court, the legislature has been apparently
willing to ignore the problem, but this passive attitude cannot continue
much longer. The exclusionary rule is, on balance, bad. Both its detrac-
tors and its advocates have continually pointed out its weaknesses.? The
Court's own decisions have recognized that the exclusion of relevant and
probative evidence serves in the main to protect the guilty.' This is inher-
ent in the rule because, e.g., the innocent person whose rights have been
violated rarely appears in court as a result of that violation, and therefore
there is no forum in which to apply the rule." Additionally, the rule can
apply only in those situations where the law enforcement agency at fault
has acted for the purpose of obtaining evidence for prosecution rather
than for other purposes, such as harrassment of less favored segments of
the society.'
2
'Early in the century, Judge (later Justice) Cardozo characterized the exclusionary
rule's anomalous result in the following terms:
The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered. . . . A
room is searched against the law, and the body of a murdered man is
found. . . . The privacy of the home has been infringed, and the murderer
goes free.
People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 23-24, 150 N.E. 585, 587, 588 (1926). Justice Jackson
catalogued the doctrine's defects for the Court in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954):
Rejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-doing official,
while it may, and likely will, release the wrong-doing defendant. It de-
prives society of its remedy against one lawbreaker because he has been
pursued by another. It protects one against whom incriminating evidence
is discovered, but does nothing to protect innocent persons who are the
victims of illegal but fruitless searches.
347 U.S. at 136. See generally THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE (1967) [hereinafter cited
as TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE]; Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal
Searches: A Conunent on People v. Cahan, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 565 (1955); Barrett, Personal
Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth Anzendment, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 46, 53-57 (1960);
Wingo, Growing Disillusionment with the Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw. L.J. 573 (1971);
Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search and Seizures Practices in Narcotics
Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 87 (1968); Comment, Use of§ 1983 to Remedy
Unconstitutional Police Conduct: Guarding the Guards, 5 HARV. CIv. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L.
REV. 104 (1970).
"°See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971); Draper
v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-33 (1949).
"See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954); Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197,
202 (4th Cir. 1966); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 442, 282 P.2d 905, 913 (1955).
"Chief Justice Warren commented on this problem in Terry v. Ohio:
Regardless of how effective the rule may be where obtaining convictions
is an important objective of the police, it is powerless to deter invasions
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If the purpose of our judicial system is to convict the guilty and to
acquit the innocent, as would seem to be its proper role, the effect of the
exclusionary rule is to detract from this end. Yet the rule goes on. Why?
It seems apparent from the most recent statements of the Supreme Court
that the rule will not be abrogated until such time as a reasonable alterna-
tive is provided.' 3 The first practical requisite of any remedy for the
excesses of the agents of the government is that it be effective, but the a
priori judgments of writers and judges have for many years indicated that
the exclusionary rule is not. Unfortunately, in the past these judgments
could not be supported by scientifically gathered statistical information.
Only recently has it come forcefully to our attention that, as stated by
Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in Bivens, "there is no empirical evi-
dence to support the claim that the [exclusionary] rule actually deters
illegal conduct of law enforcement officials."' 4 Despite this conclusion, we
of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no inter-
est in prosecuting or are willing to forego successful prosecution in the
interest of serving some other goal.
392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968). For example, 3,719 persons were arrested for investigation in Balti-
more in 1964. After being held for up to 3 days, 98% were released without charge. See
TIlE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS at 121 (1967). See generally Hahn, Ghetto Assessments
of Police Protection and Authoriy, 6 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 183 (1971).
"See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 420-21
(1971). Moreover, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), four Justices
indicated a willingness to reconsider Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which applied the
exclusionary rule to state trials. 403 U.S. at 490-91 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 493
(Burger, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); id. at 510 (Blackmun, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part); id. at 496-500 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
11403 U.S. at 416. See, e.g., Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Oaks]. Professor Oaks' exhaus-
tive study was financed by a grant from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the United States
Department of Justice. Based upon an evaluation of considerable empirical evidence, the
study concludes:
As a device for directly deterring illegal searches and seizures, the exclu-
sionary rule is a failure. There is no reason to expect the rule to have any
direct effect on the overwhelming majority of police conduct that is not
meant to result in prosecutions, and there is hardly any evidence that the
rule exerts any deterrent effect on the small fraction of law enforcement
activity that is aimed at prosecution. What is known about the deterrent
effects of sanctions suggests that the exclusionary rule operates under
conditions that are extremely unfavorable for deterring the police. The
harshest criticism of the rule is that it is ineffective. It is the sole means
of enforcing the essential guarantees of freedom from unreasonable arrests
and searches and seizures by law enforcement officers, and it is a failure
in that vital task.
Id. at 755.
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find that the Chief Justice is not disposed to relax the rule because of a
fear of the consequences of the relaxation, i.e., that it would only encour-
age other and greater intrusions by law enforcement officers into the
private affairs of our citizens."5
The question thus presents itself as to why the various legislatures
have not acted. The answer "politics" is not sufficiently enlightening. The
operative factors, however, may well include the following: First, the
public and the news media furor has, in the main, been directed at the
courts. No real attempt has been made to address this public pressure to
the legislature. Thus, without any constraint to act, legislators ordinarily
do not; or if motivated to act, they feel that in this area they are politically
impotent without the express backing of the public. Secondly, there is an
organized and vocal segment of the society which perceives itself as being
"pro-law enforcement." Its spokesmen asserverate that if we would cease
interfering with law enforcement officers, the latter would quickly solve
the crime problem. This group undoubtedly feels that proposals for legis-
lative action will introduce other difficulties for policemen, who are only
trying to perform their duties. Since this group is also likely to contain
some of the stronger backers of the more conservative legislators, it has
great political clout.
II
What type of remedy would be likely to provide the desired protection
for the ordinary citizen, and still be economically and politically feasible?
Several may be explored. For example, Justice Frankfurter, in 1949, had
no compunction in remanding the injured party "to the remedies of pri-
vate action and such protection as the internal discipline of the police,
under the eyes of an alert public opinion, may afford.""
The remedies of private action then, and in large part today, consisted
of the common law tort causes of action in assault, battery, and false
imprisonment. 7 Yet, as practicing lawyers know and the courts must
recognize, the institution of any such law suit has always required consid-
erable money for fees and costs in advance, or a high probability of
recovery so that a contingent fee is acceptable to the attorney. Very few
persons whose civil rights have been violated are likely to have either one
available. Further, juries are historically sympathetic to the police. More-
over, when there is a dispute as to the facts, they tend to take the word
'1403 U.S. at 420-21.
"Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949).
"tOther possibly applicable tort causes of action include intentional or negligent inflic-
tion of mental distress, trespass to land or chattels, conversion and malicious prosecution.
See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs (4th ed. 1971) under above
headings; comments cited at note 18 infra.
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of police officers over that of lay witnesses." And even then, if recovery
is obtained, the amount tends to be low, perhaps in part because the jury
believes that the police officer-defendant has a limited income and that
the government does not enter the financial picture. 9 The plaintiff is also
frequently from a minority group, may not make a good appearance, may
have a criminal record, and rarely is able to obtain a jury's sympathy. 0
The result is that most civil rights violations are not practicably and
reasonably litigable under such common law tort causes of action.
Pari passu, what would be the effect of a criminal sanction? Can the
legislature make it a crime for its officers to violate the civil rights of the
citizens? This simplistic solution may, at first, seem to have some validity.
We find, however, that since 1948 the federal government has proscribed
the search of a private dwelling by federal officers without a warrant,
unless consented to or pursuant to a lawful arrest.21 A federal agent
making such an unlawful search is subject to a penalty of up to $1,000
fine on the first offense, and up to $1,000 fine plus imprisonment for up
to one year for each subsequent offense.22 Perhaps, understandably, fed-
eral prosecutors have shown a great lack of interest in bringing criminal
proceedings against their own law enforcement agents under the stat-
ute.?
An early attempt to provide a statutory civil remedy is contained in
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which provides, in one of its sections, for a
"See Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L.
REV. 493 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Foote]; Comment, The Case Against Improper Motive
and Civil Inununity of Police, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 77 (1970). See generally Symposium
on Police Tort Liability, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 397-454 (1967).
"Cf., Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 1966). Several commentators
have proposed legislation to impose liability on political subdivisions whose officers commit
an offense. 3 K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 25.17, 26.03 (1958); Mathes
& Jones, Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" Immunity for Police Officers in Damage
Actions, 53 GEO. L.J. 889 (1965).
"See Chief Justice Burger's observations to this effect at 403 U.S. 421-22.
21See Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 41 VA. L.
REv. 621 (1955).
2218 U.S.C. § 2236 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, being an officer, agent, or employee of the United States or any
department or agency thereof, engaged in the enforcement of any law of
the United States, searches any private dwelling used and occupied as such
dwelling, without a warrant directing such search, or maliciously and
without probable cause searches any other building or property without a
search warrant, shall be fined for a first offense not more than $1000; and
for a subsequent offense, shall be fined not more than $1000 or imprisoned
not more than one year, or both.
Id.
"nSee Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 137 (1954); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
42 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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civil action for the deprivation of civil rights. 4 This particular action is,
however, still available only as against state and local officers, and makes
no provision for any effective control over federal agents. Also, this form
of action is subject to the same problems as applied to the common law
torts. Although the 1871 statute has been in effect for over a hundred
years, its inability to deter wrongful police conduct must be taken as
having been established by the fact that the Supreme Court, ninety years
after its passage, extended the exclusionary rule to the states because it
felt that there was no effective control over the local officers.2 More
recently, Chief Justice Burger conceded that private damage actions
against individual police officers have not adequately remedied the prob-
lems of error and deliberate misconduct by law enforcement officials.
2
1
The remedy of injuncion against police officials to prevent repeated
abuses is reasonably confined to such a narrow area as to be almost
totally ineffective against the casual or one-time-only violation.2 In the
usual case there is just no opportunity for injunction, or appeal to disin-
terested intervention. "The citizen's choice is quietly to submit to what-
ever the officers undertake or to resist at the risk of arrest or immediate
violence."' ' The type of case in which an injunction may be used is,
perhaps, best exemplified in the Fourth Circuit opinion of Lankford v.
Gelston.21 There police had undertaken systematically to search whole
areas of a minority community, admittedly without probable cause to do
so. 31 Speaking for a unanimous court, sitting en banc, Judge Sobeloff
2'Civil Rights Act of 1871 § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). For text of§ 1983, see note 8
supra. See also District of Columbia v. Carter, - U.S. _..._ 93 S. Ct. 602 (1973) (§ 1983
held inapplicable in the District of Columbia since it is not a "state or territory.") It is
important to note that § 1983 provides no remedy against the municipal employer. Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2 Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 421 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
21njunction as a remedy for unconstitutional acts by the police is authorized by 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). For a discussion of the injunction as a remedy for civil rights viola-
tions by police see Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police
Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1968).
"Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181-82 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
21364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
WThe court stated:
This case reveals a series of the most flagrant invasions of privacy ever to
come under the scrutiny of a federal court. . . . The parties seeking re-
dress have committed no acts warranting violation of the privacy of their
homes. . . . It was not contended by the Attorney General . . . that
information from an anonymous and unverifiable source is probable cause
for the search of a home.
Id. at 201-2.
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reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded for a decree enjoin-
ing the police department from conduct which would, in any event, have
been unlawful. Thus the effect of the injunction was merely to order the
police to obey the law. There was no recovery for the persons whose rights
had already been violated, nor was there any provision for reimbursement
for the costs of bringing suit by the persons acting as plaintiffs for the
community. In effect, then, certain individuals within the community
were put to the bother and expense of litigation in order to have the police
ordered to obey the law. The injustice of this could not have been more
flagrant.
Still another possible remedy would be the institution of a detached
and neutral official, whose duties would be to investigate the claims of
wrongdoing by government agents and officials, and attempt to adjust
them. Frequently called by the European title of "ombudsman," this
person would be charged with insuring that governmental officials, police
officers, and others act properly in the conduct of their duties. The con-
flict of interest is, however, quite obvious. If the ombudsman is an ap-
pointed official, holding office at the will of some elected official, and
therefore beholden to him as the plans advocated seem to contemplate,
pressure could be brought to bear upon him. It then could not be expected
that the ombudsman would vigorously attack the administration of the
very official to whom he owed his position. Within this context the om-
budsman appears to be a glorified public relations officer, whose job it is
to smooth over complaints and to quiet dissent and criticism. These
conclusions are reinforced by the fact that, where employed and where
now contemplated, the ombudsman is generally given no power to take
any action whatsoever, but must rely on his persuasiveness upon, and then
cooperation from, those who are the very focus of the criticism2' The
ombudsman's staff is generally tiny in relation to the size of'the govern-
ment whose agents he is to criticize, and he cannot order compensation
for persons wronged or take matters into court. Those who are aware of
the frequent outcries at the way in which professions regulate themselves,
whether they are police, physicians, or attorneys, will recognize the inher-
ent weaknesses in this scheme.
It may be hypothesized that in the future an effective remedy may be
devised which will not apply a negative sanction. A considerable quantity
of literature, usually relating to other fields than law, asserts that the
positive reinforcement of proper behavior by reward is much more effec-
"
1TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE at 200-4. For a critical analysis of the effective-
ness of civilian review boards see Note, The Administration of Complaints by Civilians
Against the Police, 77 HARV. L. REv. 499 (1964).
CIVIL RIGHTS APPEALS BOARD
tive and lasting than is a negative system of punishing wrongful acts. 2
This position, of course, is not unanimous. The contrary view may be
illustrated by the experience gained at the time that anti-discrimination
laws were first proposed. Detractors pointed out that subjective mind-
sets, opinions, characters, etc. could not be changed; the family, the
schools, and public opinion would have this task spread out over the
years. They argued that laws could not, even with sanctions, change men's
minds. Proponents of anti-discrimination laws countered that prejudices
and biases were not the focal point of the legislation-these could remain.
What the law struck at was the conduct, not the views, of those practicing,
not thinking, discrimination. The proponents of the laws won, and anti-
discrimination statutes exist in the federal and many state jurisdic-
tions.33 But there can be no doubt that the positive approach has its
place also. Police professionalization is not just an empty term. Serious
efforts are being made in many portions of the nation to upgrade the
educational level of police officers, their expertise in their field, and the
adequacy of the selection techniques for choosing candidates for entering
into police work.34 Perhaps in the near future some type of blueprint may
emerge whereby the encouragement of proper behavior can be made an
integral part of the law enforcement field. Indeed, the first steps toward
this goal have already been taken.3 5 But it is suggested that the process
be accelerated and the future drawn near.
III
What then may be suggested as an alternative approach to the present
exclusionary rule and its application? A survey of the writers who have
explored the problem, some antedating Mapp, indicates a preference for
a tort theory of liability as holding out the best immediate hope .3 How-
"One author, for example, states:
The cardinal tenet of operant conditioning is that positive reinforcement
of behavior increases the likelihood of that behavior being repeated.
Higher-order animals are to a great extent self-interested and future ori-
ented so they will conduct themselves in a manner conducive to receiving
rewards. . . . Therefore, the goal of police restraint will be facilitated if
the police are offered an irresistable temptation to act discreetly. By select-
ing powerful reinforcers and arranging reward schedules efficiently, police
administrators can induce behavior that could never be ordered.
Levine, Implementing Legal Policies through Operant Conditioning: The Case of Police
Practices, 6 LAW & Soc'y REV. 195, 210 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Levine.]
"For a discussion of this development in the field of labor law see M. FORKOSCH, A
TREATISE ON LABOR LAW 126-7 (2d ed. 1965).
'See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE.
"See Levine, supra note 32 at 217; TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE.
"'See, e.g., Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches: A Comment
on People v. Cahan, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 565 (1955);'Report of the Committee on Criminal
1973]
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ever, these writers also seem to agree that such theories should not fall
within the classical common law of tort rules. Rather, they should be
significantly modified in a number of ways. These suggestions are first
examined in some depth before attempting their amalgamation into a
proposed positive substitute.
1. Governmental Liability
In order that the tort remedy may be effective, it is necessary that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity be abrogated, thereby removing a shroud
of legal protection of the governmental employer of the offending law
enforcement agent." One positive result will be to make available to the
plaintiff a defendant of extensive financial responsibility, thereby permit-
ting assurance of collection where damages are found. Moreover, this
would eliminate one pressure upon an aggrieved person to settle for an
inadequate amount, or not to sue at all. At a time when the policies
underlying the theory of sovereign immunity have been mainly discred-
ited, and when tort liability has been extended to such eleemosynary
institutions as hospitals, 3 the theory of respondeat superior should in all
fairness be applied to municipal employers as well.
This proposed rejection of sovereign immunity would also have the
salutary effect of spreading the loss evenly over the whole range of tax-
payers of the affected community. This is desirable, both for the reason
that it reduces the impact as to the individual police officer concerned,
and also that its effect should be felt by the employer and the citizens,
i.e., where the pocketbook is affected by higher taxes, a taxpayer is more
likely to press for proper law enforcement. There is no public policy to
be served here in allowing the police officer who is over-zealous in his
duties to absorb the entire impact for his error, and ignoring the fact that
he may have been encouraged into this activity by those who employ
him.3 9 And even in those instances where the employee was not encour-
Law and Procedure, 29 CALIF. S.B.J. 263, 264 (1964); McGarr, The Exclusionary Rule:
An Ill-Conceived and Ineffective Remedy, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 266 (1961); Paulsen,
The Exclusionary Rule and Police Misconduct, 52 J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 255 (1961); Foote,
supra note 18.
"For a general discussion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity with respect to torts
see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 970-92 (4th ed. 1971); Jaffe, Suits
Against Governments and Officers, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1,209 (1963) (hereinafter cited as
Jaffe).
-'See, e.g., Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958)
and Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., 269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d 485 (1967).
"Commenting on the policy considerations favoring states' acceptance of financial
responsibility in this area, one authority argues:
If the award is in favor of the plaintiff, the state should, as New York has,
accept financial responsibility for the injury, whether mere false arrest or
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aged, there does not seem to be any overriding reason for taking the
position that a governmental employer should be any the less responsible
for the acts of its employees than is any other type of employer. Another
planned effect of this approach will be to bring to the attention of the
governmental officials the undesirability of having their agents engaged
in unlawful activity, with a consequent effort by those governmental offi-
cials to bring the offending officer into line or else suffer the consequences
at the polls when burdened taxpayers react.
2. Insulation of the Police Officer
A necessary concomitant to imposing liability on the municipal cor-
poration is to provide some effective financial shielding of the individual
officer. Otherwise, the desirable act of imposing the liability on the gov-
ernment may be lost through the use of indemnity actions, or other
procedures by which the officer must pay the bulk of the judgment. If the
governmental employer does not feel the sting of the monetary loss, one
could not expect much from the officials of that government in the way
of control of their agents, nor would there be any particular feedback
from the taxpayers, creating pressure upon those officials.
It seems to be a matter of choice whether this financial shielding of
the individual officer should be done by making this proposed cause of
action the sole remedy, or whether the presently existing remedies would
continue to be available at the option of the plaintiff. In the latter case,
of course, the possibility arises that a judgment against the individual
officer obtained in a common law action could co-exist with a judgment
against the governmental employer under this new cause of action being
here proposed. There could be only one recovery, and if the damages
assessed against the employer are reasonable, it would seem that the
advantages of bringing suit under this new remedy would, in almost all
gross brutality. It is, after all, the state which puts the officer in a position
to employ force and which benefits from its use. There is something to
the argument that if the treasury pays, the deterrent effect of the judgment
on the police officer is dulled. But perhaps the weight of the argument as
to deterrence is the other way. If recovery can be had only against the
officer and he is judgment proof, deterrence is at a minimum. If a judg-
ment is collected against the state, the state may in outrageous cases have
recourse against the officer either out of his funds or in the form of
discipline. Furthermore, police tactics are often institutional and awards
against the state may modify institutional practices.
Jaffe, supra note 37 at 227-28. Additional reasons for imposing liability on the municipal
employer include (I) the injustice of penalizing the officer required to exercise discretion,
and (2) the public's need of his uninhibited action. Cf., Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579,
580-81 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
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cases, result in a conscious choice of the action against the employer and
an abandonment of any action against the individual officer. Another
possibility would be to require that the prospective plaintiff choose be-
tween the statutory action against the government and the common law
action against the officer. The election of one form of action would
effectively preclude the other. Again, in this situation it would appear that
in most cases the statutory action against the government would be cho-
sen.
The inclusion of a financial shield for the police officer would also
have the very practical and political advantage of enlisting the help of the
police, their supporting organizations, and police-oriented segments of
the community in the initiation of this plan. It would appear that this
aspect of a direct suit against the governmental employer, insulating the
officer, would result in a positive reaction both from police officers and
from those political elements which are regarded as "pro-law enforce-
ment." Thus by including a financial shield this segment of the com-
munity may be enlisted to support the proposed substitute, a practical
consideration which, on the scales, balances out any prior disadvantages.
3. Administrative Procedure
This remedy is a statutory one, and contemplates that the respondent
will be a governmental unit. On a federal level, this narrows itself down
to only one possible defendant, the United States. If applied on a state
level, the respondent iight be either the state or a political subdivision
thereof, e.g., a county or a city. It should, therefore, be unnecessary to
provide the full panoply of court procedures in arranging for the remedy.
This would be especially true in a situation where the choice of remedy
would exist, permitting the plaintiff to have the option of proceeding in
an ordinary court action against the law enforcement agent, but thereby
surrendering any possibility of collecting directly from the government.
Having elected the administrative remedy, the plaintiff could not be
heard to complain that no right of jury trial or of judicial due process
was provided. Furthermore, the defendant being a governmental unit, and
the remedy having been provided by that sovereign, there could be no
defense complaint. It would be necessary to provide only the minimum
constitutional administrative due process to each party. It would then be
possible, within well known principles, to provide a summary remedy
which would give the desired deterrent effect and at the same time provide
for considerably lowered cost. In this way the cost of establishing the
entire procedure should be substantially less than the present cost of
defending ordinary tort law suits in the state and federal trial court sys-
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tems. This cost is presently borne by either the federal government or by
the state or its subdivisions in that the daily costs of operating the courts
are a charge upon the government. In many jurisdictions, moreover, there
are additional costs where the governmental unit provides legal defense
for its law enforcement officers when they are sued by tort claimants."
Much as the preceding suggestion of a financial shield is felt to be
popular with police, this aspect of a contemplated lowering of costs to
the government should make the plan attractive to appointive and elective
officials, as well as the taxpayers. For those governmental bodies which
provide tort liability insurance protection for their employees, the re-
duced number of tort law suits brought directly against the employees in
the trial courts should effect a further reduction in costs to the govern-
mental agency, thereby offsetting to some degree the awards given suc-
cessful claimants under the new procedure.
4. Abrogation of Common Law Defenses
Since the basic purpose of initiating the new statutory remedy is to
deter the police officers from those action's which have been so con-
demned by our courts over the years, thereby giving rise to the exclusion-
ary rule, it cannot be made a prerequisite to recovery that the person
wronged be a high-minded or leading member of the community. It is
obvious that this is not the type of person who is usually the recipient of
that police conduct which, hopefully, will be deterred by this procedure.
On the contrary, the person who is most likely to be victimized by police
errors or deliberate misconduct is the person least likely to be heard to
complain, namely, the oppressed, the person with a criminal record, and
the outcast of society. 1 To eliminate this large group from a remedy by
permitting a "clean hands" defense would emasculate the entire plan, and
no doubt the Supreme Court would refuse to find that an effective substi-
tute for the exclusionary rule had been obtained.
"See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 995 (West 1961). This statute was construed and
applied in Sinclair v. Arnebergh, 224 Cal. App. 2d 595, 36 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1964). For
statutes dealing with indemnification of police officers for damages see TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 6-640 (Repl. vol. 1971) and Wis. STAT. § 285.06 (1961).
- "For a potential plaintiff who lacks the minimum elements of respectability, there is
little chance of success in court. His prior reputation, moreover, can usually be shown for
three purposes; (I) to impeach his credibility as a witness; (2) to mitigate damages by
showing that his reputation was such that it would not have been damaged by an arrest or
by showing that his prior record of arrests or imprisonment negated the inference that he
suffered mental anguish; and (3) to mitigate damages by showing probable cause for the
arrest, thereby negating the inference that the defendant acted wantonly or maliciously. See,
e.g., Butcher v. Adams, 310 Ky. 205, 220 S.W.2d 398 (1959); Odinetz v. Budds, 315 Mich.
512, 24 N.W.2d 193 (1946).
19731
236 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXX
In the same manner, it cannot be expected that much deterrent value
will result if a "good faith" defense is permitted. The issue of the good
faith of the officer should be irrelevant where the underlying purpose of
the remedy is to obtain a deterrent effect. If this remedy were designed
as punishment, good faith might be a proper criterion. However, it has
long been recognized that where a deterrent effect is desired, and where
the penalty has a relatively minor impact upon the defendant, even a
penal sanction is possible.12 Thus we do have "strict liability" criminal
statutes. Also, in other areas of tort law such as the product liability, the
public interest has been advanced by imposing strict liability. 3
In structuring this remedy, therefore, with deterrence the underlying
policy, strict liability should be imposed. The only issues then before the
tribunal would be whether the civil rights of the plaintiff were infringed,
and whether such infringement occurred as a result of official law en-
forcement activity. Questions of intent, negligence, or accident should not
be relevant.
5. Damages
Because of the peculiar nature of the remedy here proposed, it is
believed necessary that certain consequences, expected to flow from
wrongful activities of the officers, should not be taken into consideration
in determining damages. Thus, even though it can be foreseen by the
officer that his violation of a person's civil rights will likely result in
conviction of a crime, the fact of that conviction or subsequent punish-
ment should not be included as an item of damages. Otherwise the unfor-
tunate result, often criticized in the press, would be a rewarding of the
criminal for his wrongdoing. The government would then find itself in the
unenviable position of saying, on the one hand, that it was punishing the
individual for his actions and, on the other hand, that we would have to
compensate that person because we were punishing him. It thus follows
that the question of damages should be directly related to the enormity
of the wrong done by the officer rather than to the consequences which
may flow therefrom."
To illustrate this in a common situation, hypothesize the wrongful
"Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 218-33 (1972) for a discussion
of liability without fault in criminal cases.
"See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). California is particularly
advanced in this field. Two very recent cases have gone far toward removing the few
limitations which had crept into the law, further diminishing the plaintiff's burden. See
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 104 Cal. Rptr. 434, - P.2d - (1972);
Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, - P.2d - (1972).
"See Foote, supra note 18 at 512-16; Oaks, supra note 14 at 718.
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stopping of a vehicle by an officer, which then produces probable cause
for search and seizure and may eventually result in a prison sentence for
a serious crime. In this case the wrongful conduct of the officer which
would be compensated for is merely the improper stopping of the vehicle.
This would result in a minimal recovery. On the other hand a physical
beating of an accused by officers, though it might result in nothing more
than a temporary detention, would be heavily compensated. The balanc-
ing to be performed would be very similar to that which is done in
determining what is "probable cause."45 In other words, the severity of
the intrusion is the key factor.
The remedy being evaluated is, as stated, not primarily designed to
compensate the victim but to deter misconduct. It should nevertheless be
flexible enough as a system to serve both purposes, where proper. In order
to be effective as a remedy, a sufficient proportion of those wronged
would have to be encouraged to complain so the bulk of wrongful conduct
would be detected and brought before a competent hearing officer. To
accomplish this, it would be necessary to establish minimum damages"
of a size sufficient to attract not only plaintiffs but also competent legal
counsel with, perhaps, legal specialization resulting if a sufficient volume
of complaints were generated.
This specialization might even be encouraged, as it may result in the
development of an expertise and of office procedures which would facili-
tate the handling of thse actions, eventually resulting in a reduction in the
minimum amount of damages which would have to be awarded in order
to make the remedy attractive to attorneys. At first, however, a "reasona-
ble attorney's fee" should be provided for, so as to recompense the attor-
ney in handling even small cases. If the agreed compensation for the
attorney were a percentage of the recovery (ordinarily the method utilized
in personal injury cases), then it might be higher in small recovery cases,
i.e., those which involve situations where the intrusion by the officer was
relatively slight. This scheme simultaneously makes it feasible for attor-
neys to handle even the smallest cases, and to do so economically. One
major advantage of thus encouraging the bringing of case into the statu-
"The Supreme Court, in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), stated:
In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search
be obtained, "probable cause" is the standard by which a particular deci-
sion to search is tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonable-
ness. . . . [But there is] no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the
search entails.
387 U.S. at 536-37. This rationale was accepted by the Court and extended to seizure as
well as search in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
"For a discussion of the use of minimum liquidated damages where deterrence is a goal
see Foote, supra note 18 at 496-97, 514-16.
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tory procedure would be the salutary effect it should have on the police
officer. Further, the governmental unit, which would have to pay the
actual judgments, would be more likely to exercise its supervisory control
and demand that its agents conform to a reasonable standard, thereby
reducing the number of cases in which a successful recovery may be had.
Thus the procedure is both self-enforcing and, hopefully, self-diminishing.
Another considerable advantage under this plan is that the govern-
mental body could also protect itself and its subdivisions from excessive
judgments. That is, so long as recoveries were reasonable, the government
should be able to set the maximum amount to be awarded in various types
of cases. This would tend to equalize the situation we now find, where
the plaintiff who demonstrates only a minor injury may frequently go
without remedy while the plaintiff who demonstrates serious injury may
receive an award of punitive damages unrelated to the severity of the
intrusion. Thus, by statute, the governmental unit could compress the
range of damages to a reasonable degree.
In order to further insure the availability of effective counsel to plain-
tiffs in these actions, there should be a procedural requirement that pay-
ment of the compensation be made or forwarded to the successful litigant
through his attorney's office. Alternatively it might be required that the
percentage of the recovery awarded to the successful litigant's attorney
be approved by the tribunal. In this way, it may be possible for the
governmental body to issue two checks, one to the litigant and one to his
attorney. This would greatly increase the attractiveness of the procedure
to the practicing bar and, perhaps, reduce the cost of representation to
successful plaintiffs.
IV
As has perhaps been foreseen in the foregoing discussion, the proce-
dure advocated is one which is in many ways similar to that which has
been established by most states as workmen's compensation legislation.
California's Workmen's Compensation Act is one example.4 7 Under this
state constitutionally-mandated and legislatively-implemented scheme,
California has created a whole apparatus designed specifically to handle
this type of compensation. It is based upon a no-fault concept and liability
is established by the employer-employee relationship. The purpose is to
rehabilitate the employee and to compensate him for his injury."8 Employ-
ers are required to carry insurance, which guarantees that the employee
"TCAL. LABOR CODE §§ 3201-6002 (West 1971).
"xSee, e.g., Davison v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 241 Cal. App. 2d 15, 50 Cal. Rptr.
76 (1966).
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will have a financially sound source from which to receive recovery.49
In the civil rights area, however, it would be undesirable to permit the
governmental body to insure itself against liability since the major pur-
pose of this plan is that the cost of paying compensation will have a
deterrent effect. If the government can insulate itself from the expense
consequent upon an award for the wrongful acts of its employees, then
the possibility of such a deterrent effect would become so remote as to
be negligible, and thereby destroy the plan. In addition, the no-fault
aspects of workmen's compensation are inapplicable since, in the civil
rights area, necessity of there having been a wrongful act by the govern-
ment's servant is a proper and necessary prerequisite.
The aspects of workmen's compensation which are useful are those
relating to the procedures by which enforcement is obtained. In general,
California's plan sets up a State Division of Industrial Accidents, within
which there is a Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board." Local off-
ices of WCAB are located at various population centers throughout the
state so as to service applicants easily. Referees are available to hear
contested matters in quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, with wit-
nesses being heard, arguments given, and a decision rendered. Eventual
appellate channels to the courts are also available, with complete steno-
graphic record of the proceedings in the WCAB being provided.
Other aspects of workmen's compensation proceedings may be useful
in creating a new remedy in civil rights violations. Thus the type of
evidence to be received might be limited to that which is relevant to the
issues and purposes at hand. At the same time, strict judicial rules of
evidence may be relaxed to admit hearsay where this would further rather
than impede the hearing. In addition, there is no right to jury trial, and
computation of damages is based upon a mandated, rigid scheme relating
to the injury received and its effect.
The applicant is favored in workmen's compensation cases, and he is
further protected by the requirement that the attorney's fee be subject to
the referee's discretion. This has favored the creation of de facto special-
ists in workmen's compensation cases to whom others, not so well in-
formed, generally refer their clients.
This, then, is the type of tribunal which may be utilized as, for exam-
ple, a Civil Rights Appeal Board. Under the contemplated statutory
enactment, centers of population would be provided with local offices in
which would be located referees to hear claims against the government.
These referees by study and experience would become experts in this
specialized field. As is usual in the case of referees, their compensation
"CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 3600, 3700, 3706 (West 1971).
" CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 5300-17 (West 1971).
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would be significantly less than that of judges of even courts of limited
jurisdiction. No right of jury trial would be allowed. Since the major
purpose of the legislation would be to provide a deterrent effect upon the
agents of the government, rather than the mere compensation of the
applicant, the referee would be instructed to provide compensation in
those cases where the government had in fact acted wrongly. He would
not identify with the government or its law enforcement agents, but see
himself as a person whose job is to control misuse of the power of the
government.
All of the desirable elements heretofore set forth (see III supra) could
be implemented in this type of statutory scheme. In order to maintain a
control or check on the costs of the awards given in these tribunals, the
legislature (Congress) might enact enabling statutes which would specify
the types of civil injuries which could be expected to come before the
tribunals and set minimum and maximum limits for each type of injury.
The referee would have discretion to operate within these limits, depend-
ing upon the aggravating or mitigating circumstances in each fact situa-
tion. As a further control, it might be specified in the enabling legislation
that the only injuries compensable would be those which would be recog-
nized as injuries at the time of the occurrence. Although the state and
federal Supreme Courts can and do apply their rulings retroactively, this
should not here be a ground for recognizing a wrong. The overriding
purpose of this legislation being deterrence, it is inconsistent to reward
applicants for acts done by the government's agents which were, at the
time of their occurrence, apparently legitimate.51
V
It is salutary to concede that the implementation of a plan such as
this faces serious problems. The most obvious, probably the greatest, is
the political aspect. Legislators are, by their very nature, politically moti-
vated: they will not move to implement such a state or national scheme
unless the political climate is right. Undoubtedly it will be necessary that
there be a consensus that this plan is beneficial to almost everyone before
passage can be expected. The primary danger is that which will arise if
some considerable segment of the population sees it as an attack on the
"'The Supreme Court, in Person v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) stated:
We hold that the defense of good faith and probable cause, which the
Court of Appeals found available to the officers in the common-law action
for false arrest and imprisonment, is also available to them in the action
under § 1983 .... We agree that a police officer is not charged with
predicting the future course of constitutional law.
386 U.S. at 557.
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police. It is not. On the contrary, one of the major effects of this legisla-
tion will be to insulate financially the individual police officer. Indeed,
recovery under this plan can easily be made the sole remedy for injuries
of this type.
As earlier discussed, with a friendly forum it will be a very exceptional
case that will be taken to some other tribunal or jurisdiction where the
advantages afforded the complainant will not be as great. In this way the
police officer on the beat, the man who endangers himself for the protec-
tion of the public, will no longer, for the most part, be subjected to tort
liability. Only in a very aggravated situation, where multiple actions of
the same officer have made it obvious that he is not fit for this type of
duty, will the officer be in any fear of losing his employment. Properly,
he should be in such a case. Occasional errors of judgment, on the other
hand, will be very unlikely to have such a result since it can be expected
that most officers will accumulate a few such incidents over an extended
period of time. Early detection of the officer likely to have multiple
complaints of this sort would also permit administrative action by his
superiors to move him to a less sensitive assignment, and in that way
retain him as a useful member of the agency.
The next greatest problem foreseen is that of finances. The establish-
ment of a separate system of tribunals to process this type of claim will
obviously cost money. How much depends upon the jurisdiction, salaries
paid, rent, and other factors far beyond the scope of this analysis, al-
though it will undoubtedly be considerable. Opponents of the plan taking
a superficial view may point to these costs as an overriding factor. More
careful analysts will note, however, that there are balancing factors at
work. At present, claims against police officers are handled in the ordi-
nary courts where the expenses of operation must be several times more
than in this suggested administrative tribunal. The factor of the right to
jury trial alone adds greatly to the court costs, as jury trials take longer
and require judges of a higher salary. They also require more courtroom
personnel and larger courtrooms. All of these costs are presently borne
by the taxpayers. Additional costs may include provision of a defense
counsel who is on the public payroll. This is already the practice in many
jurisdictions where police officers who are sued civilly under common law
tort remedies are frequently defended by government attorneys at the
taxpayers' expense.52 In addition, when those actions result in a recovery
by the plaintiff, it is quite frequently the government which pays the
judgment, especially where sovereign immunity has been abrogated. Such
judgments may be many times larger than those which could be recovered
under this suggested administrative system. One further result, already
52See note 40 supra.
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related, will be that to the degree this system succeeds the deterrent effect
sought will gradually reduce the numbers of such incidents, and hopefully
their magnitude. Thus, in the long run, the cost to the government will
be reduced.
Another problem factor is that, with the high percentage of the mem-
bers of our legislatures who are lawyers, some may be so enamored of
the exclusionary rule as a defense weapon that they will resist any attempt
to dispose of it. Many of our younger lawyers will have attended law
school and entered into practice since Mapp v. Ohio." To them, and
perhaps to others as well, the exclusionary rule may have acquired a halo.
The rule itself may be seen as a constitutional imperative, rather than a
judicially created remedy. If so, they may naturally be expected to resist
an attempt to dispose of the rule. For them, however, the aspects of this
plan which provide for the compensation of victims of government misuse
of power should be emphasized. This plan does not benefit only the
wrongdoer. Unlike the exclusionary rule, it reaches out to spread its
protection over all those who may have been wronged. For that reason,
if no other, it should be preferred.
Will the United States Supreme Court abrogate the exclusionary rule
if this plan is implemented? Can the exclusionary rule be applied in some
states (those which have not implemented the suggested administrative
tribunal) and not in others? Is it necessary that this plan be adopted
nationally, by the Congress, or is it possible that each state can solve its
own problem? The answers to these questions seem to lie with the Su-
preme Court, and any attempt to predict can only be speculative.
The most prominent position against abrogation of the exclusionary
rule upon adoption of a reasonable alternative seems to be the "judicial
integrity" argument.54 In those cases where it has been considered, how-
ever, it would appear that the argument that the court should not lend
its imprimatur to the use of illegally obtained evidence has always seemed
to be a secondary and less weighty argument. As compared to the practi-
cal effect of the exclusionary rule, it appears to be on a higher and more
theoretical plane, less in line with the practicalities of human behavior.
-367 U.s. 643 (1961).
"The "judicial integrity" theory was articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968):
Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party
to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting
unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions. . . . A ruling
admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we recognize, has the necessary
effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence, while an
application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional imprima-
tur.
392 U.S. at 13.
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It can be hoped that when actually faced with the situation in which a
viable alternative has been instituted, the Court will not allow the argu-
ment of judicial integrity to outweigh the obvious inequities in the contin-
ued use of the exclusionary rule. In his dissent in Mapp, Justice Harlan
indicated that the states should be free to institute their own, perhaps
more effective, restraints." But if the rule is abrogated as to those states
where a more effective plan exists, what results as to the other jurisdic-
tions? Will the Court accept only a national plan? These and other ques-
tions remain unanswered. However, any inability now to resolve these
questions must not act as an anchor to bind us fast to the outmoded
exclusionary rule.
5Mr. Justice Harlan stated:
The preservation of a proper balance between state and federal responsi-
bility in the administration of criminal justice demands patience on the
part of those who might like to see things move faster among the states
in this respect. . . . One state . . . may conclude that the need for em-
bracing [the exclusionary] rule is pressing because other remedies are
unavailable or inadequate. . . . Another. . . may choose to. . . [allow]
all evidence relevant to guilt to be brought into a criminal trial, and [deal]
with Constitutional infractions by other means.
367 U.S. at 381-2 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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